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Feminism and Solidarity on the Left:  
Rethinking the Unhappy Marriage Metaphor 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this article, we re-examine the longstanding question about the character and extent of political 
solidarity between feminists and other actors on the left. This question has taken on renewed 
relevance in many contexts, given the challenges posed by a resurgent xenophobic and misogynistic 
right and the rise of a putative left  ‘ƉŽƉƵůŝƐŵ ? that is attempting to broaden its appeal beyond class 
struggle (e.g., Prentoulis and Thomassen, 2015). Close to home, left-wing responses to austerity 
politics in the UK have gained an increasing profile, while seeking to accommodate feminist 
organisations and ideas (e.g., Maiguashca et al., 2016; Dean and Maiguashca, 2018). In Scotland, 
specifically, the 2014 campaign for independence sparked  ‘ĂĚĞďĂƚĞĂďŽƵƚƐŽĐŝĂůũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇĂŶĚĂŶŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇĨŽƌƌĂĚŝĐĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? (Boyd, 2014), that saw persistent feminist efforts 
to move gender inequality to the centre of discussion (e.g., Caskie, 2015; Boyd and Morrison, 2014). 
Simultaneously, there is ample evidence of the persistence of sexual violence, gendered 
discrimination and hostility to feminism across sites of left politics, old and new (e.g., Eschle, 2018; 
Coleman and Bassi, 2011; Bindel, 2011).  
 
We focus here on the conceptual framework through which the relationship between feminism and 
the left is most often approached. It was Heidi Hartmann (1981) who first characterised that 
relationship as an  ‘ƵŶŚĂƉƉǇŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ?. ,ĂƌƚŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ analysis was highly influential in socialist feminist 
activist-academic debates at the time of publication, and the deployment of the marriage metaphor 
when considering political solidarities as well as theoretical affinities between feminism and the left 
continues to resonate in academic literature (e.g., Cock and Luxton, 2013; Aruzza, 2013; Carver, 
2009). This is not insignificant, in our view. Metaphors are important analytical devices that help to 
constitute our understanding of political issues, making some dimensions of these issues visible 
while occluding others. As successful metaphors become naturalised, they do powerful political 
work while remaining beyond scrutiny. In that light, the persistent use of the marriage metaphor to 
characterise relations between feminists and other left actors merits critical reflection, from not only 
feminist scholars, but also the wider community of scholars concerned with theorising political 
solidarity.  
 
Although the original  ‘unhappy marriage ? debate was as much about theoretical affinity as it was 
about political solidarity, our focus in this article is limited to the latter. In other senses, however, 
our take is broader than might be expected. The literature is concerned largely with feminism and 
Marxism, both conceived as singular and distinct. This is reductionist in at least two ways, first 
because neither feminism nor Marxism are monolithic as social forces or schools of thought; some 
Marxisms integrate feminist concerns while others implicitly or explicitly render these concerns 
secondary.1 Similarly, some feminisms are ideologically and organisationally closer to Marxism than 
others. Second, ƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ‘ƵŶŚĂƉƉǇŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ?ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ replicates a widespread move to narrow 
 ‘ƚŚĞůĞĨƚ ?to Marxism, thus excluding from view diverse strands of activism claiming the left label. For 
instance, it has rightly been pointed out that a narrow definition of the left serves in US and 
European contexts to focus attention on white-dominated organisations (Alcoff and Gray-Rosendale, 
2005; Bassel and Emejulu, 2017). In our treatment of the debate, we thus strive not only to 
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŚĞƚĞƌŽŐĞŶĞŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ? ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƚŽwiden our 
metaphoriĐĂůůĞŶƐƚŽŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ‘ƚŚĞůĞĨƚ ? in more general terms, understood as a collective political 
project committed to an egalitarian ethos (for a fuller discussion, see Eschle and Maiguashca, 2014: 
645-646; 2018: 231-232). This allows us to incorporate into our analysis the range of left political 
forces beyond Marxism, fighting against a range of axes of inequality and with differing substantive 
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egalitarian visions. Moreover, according to this reasoning, feminists, with their commitment to 
overturning gender inequalities, are already, inherently of the left, even if some are more radical 
than others. Consequently, we are concerned here with how the marriage metaphor can aid or 
obscure understanding of the relations of feminism, broadly conceived, to a range of potential 
partners on this shared political terrain. 
 
In what follows, then, we interrogate the work done by the marriage metaphor when thinking about 
the character and extent of political solidarity between feminists and other actors on the left. In 
parts one and two, we argue that the metaphor as usually deployed leads to simplification and 
determinism in the analysis of political connections, but that there remains scope to modify the 
metaphor in light of feminist critiques and reconstructions of the institution of marriage. We show in 
part three that this yields a fuller, more nuanced and more open-ended picture of connection 
between feminism and other left actors through discussion of three empirical case studies of left 
organising in Scotland: Occupy Glasgow, the Radical Independence Campaign (RIC) and the Scottish 
National Party (SNP). As elaborated in part three, these case studies are based primarily on 
interviews we conducted with feminist activists in each of these organisations, and reflect a period 
of left mobilisations immediately before, during and just after the time of the 2012-2014 Scottish 
independence referendum, wherein new relationships between feminists and other left forces were 
forged and contested. Although the complexities of these relationships are more accurately 
reflected by the expanded rather than narrow marriage metaphor, we conclude our analysis by 
raising concerns about the elasticity of the metaphor overall, and indeed of the institution of 
marriage itself, urging feminist scholars and others to continue to develop alternative ways of 
conceptualising personal and collective affinities. 
 
I. Revisiting the Unhappy Marriage Metaphor 
 
/Ŷ,ĂƌƚŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛoriginal article, the  ‘ƵŶŚĂƉƉǇŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ? between Marxism and feminism is rooted in 
the dominance of Marxism and the consequent subordination of feminism. For Hartmann, the key 
locus of this subordinating dynamic, and the focus of her analysis, is theoretical: the reductionist 
DĂƌǆŝƐƚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǁŽŵĂŶquestion ?(1981: 3), in relation to capital rather than to men, which 
thus fails to explain why women fulfil particular roles, subordinated to men, within capitalism. 
Hartmann seeks to integrate analyses of patriarchy and capitalism, and thereby to create a fuller 
understanding of the gendered dynamics of the economy. It can be argued that HartmanŶ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ
of Marxist theory focuses on a straw-figure in the form of the more mechanistic, class-determinist 
variants and neglects the emergence of anti-ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůŝƐƚŽƌ ‘EĞǁ ?DĂƌǆŝƐŵ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚĂ full 
assessment of her theoretical interpretation and reworking lies beyond the purview of this article. Of 
more interest to us here, she also ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚĂ ‘ŵŽƌĞƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞƵŶŝŽŶ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ
between feminists and Marxists, that is, ĂŶĞŶĚƚŽŵĂůĞƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
labour and subordination of their priorities in left organisations (1981: 31). This requires feminists to 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉ ‘our own organizatioŶƐĂŶĚŽƵƌŽǁŶƉŽǁĞƌďĂƐĞ ? (1981: 32) ?ĂŶĚƚŽƉƵƐŚǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
experiences and values into the centre of any vision of a better world (1981: 32-33). As Carol Ehrlich 
sums up, Hartmann assumes that  ‘ ?marxism can be persuaded that an egalitarian marriage is in 
(his? Its?) best interests [and] the marriage can be saved. And it should be saved: they need each 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ?(1981: 113).  
 
,ĂƌƚŵĂŶŶ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐƐƚƌƵĐŬĂĐŚŽƌĚĂƚƚŚĞtime, partly because of the metaphorical language she 
deployed. Much of the immediate response creatively  redeployed the metaphor, as in the criticisms 
ŽĨ,ĂƌƚŵĂŶ ?Ɛ theoretical analysis put forward by anarchist Carol Ehrlich (1981: 131) and Black 
feminist Gloria Joseph (1981: 92), thereby reinforcing the impression that  ‘DĂƌƌŝĂŐĞŝƐƚŚĞ only game 
ŝŶƚŽǁŶ ? ?^Ăƌgent, 1981a: xxx, 92). Lisa Vogel ?ƐƌĞũŽŝŶĚĞƌǁĂƐmore cautious, listing various sexual 
metaphor scenarios -  ‘/ůŝĐŝƚ tryst? Teenage infatuation? May-December romance?  ?WůĂƚŽŶŝĐ
3 
 
relationship? Barren alliance? Marriage of convenience? Shotgun wedding? ?(1981: 196) - before 
concluding all such metaphors are problematic. Nonetheless, the notion of the unhappy marriage 
has continued to resonate in efforts to make sense of the place of feminism on the left beyond the 
US and UK (Jayawardena and Kelkar, 1989; Chinchilla, 1991), beyond Marxism (Bottici, 2014), and 
into the contemporary era (Aruzza, 2013; Carver, 2009; Bryson, 2004).  
 
So what work is this metaphor doing? Simply put, a metaphor is a figurative trope rather than literal 
descriptor; iƚ ‘ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞůǇƌĞƉůĂĐĞƐŽŶĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĞƌǁŝƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? based on the principle of comparison ? 
(Nabers, 2015: 136) or  ‘analogy ? (Mussolf, 2004). ŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂů ?Žƌ
 ‘ƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞ ?ǀŝĞǁ that metaphors function to convey (or obscure) an external reality by switching to 
another term with a family resemblance, the contemporary literature coheres around an 
 ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝǀĞ ? ? ‘ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞ ?or  ‘constitutive ? approach,  in which metaphors actively construct 
understanding of and responses to phenomena, including political issues (e.g., Carver and Pikalo, 
2008: 2-4; Cammaerts, 2012: 230, 232-234; Mussolf, 2004: 1-2). Metaphors work by transferring 
certain traits from the referent object to the object under discussion, thereby elevating some 
dimensions of that object and downplaying others. Where metaphors are particularly successful  W 
where constant repetition leads to them becoming axiomatic in character - the associated 
interpretation becomes  ‘ƐƵďůŝŵŝŶĂů ?ĐŽŵŵŽŶ-ƐĞŶƐĞ ?(Cammaerts, 2012: 233), and alternatives 
become unthinkable. In the context of political discourse, then, metaphors 'do not merely embellish 
political language but rather play a part in structuring the field of politics itself' (Honohan, 2008: 69).  
 
WŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇ ?ĂƐ/ƐĞƵůƚ,ŽŶŽŚĂŶŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐ ?ŚĂƐ ‘ůong been understood in terms of metaphors 
drawn from the body and close relationships of family and friends  ? ?ƚŚĂƚ ? lend themselves to 
consolidating (if not determining) limited solidarities' (2008: 70, our emphasis). Certainly, the limiting 
effect of the marriage metaphor in mainstream political discourse has been ably demonstrated in 
analyses of contexts as diverse as the unification of Germany (Dueck, 2001), political coalition in 
Serbia (Durovic and Silaski, 2010) and the independence referendum in Scotland (Carr, 2014). 
Feminist critics have shown there is a marked tendency in these contexts to present one entity in the 
political partnership under discussion as masculine and the other as feminine, and correspondingly 
to code the masculine partner as active, independent and responsible, and the feminine partner as 
passive, dependent and needing guidance, and thereby rightly subordinated. In some instances, the 
feminised actor is also overtly sexualised, presented as desirable or as using deceitful feminine wiles 
to manipulate a potential partner. In such ways, invocations of the marriage metaphor in 
mainstream politics have functioned to undermine one partner in the political relationship described 
and reify patriarchal, heterosexist norms of marriage. 
 
In contrast, Hartmann and subsequent feminist authors writing on the relationship of feminism to 
the left are not upholding the traditional marriage institution as a normative ideal. Quite the 
opposite: they are using the metaphor of marriage to convey the difficulties in the relationship 
between feminism and other left forces. They are also explicitly clinging to the possibility of a more 
 ‘progressive union ? ?pace ƚŚĞƐƵďƚŝƚůĞŽĨ,ĂƌƚŵĂŶŶ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ. However, it is our view 
that the deployment of the marriage metaphor in this context remains problematic. It is 
 ‘theoretically inadequate ? because it occludes internal complexity in both feminism and Marxism by 
representing them as equivalent to unitary, rational individuals (Vogel, 1981: 196). Moreover, as 
these individuals are gendered, in the sense that feminism is figured as female and the left as male, 
the metaphor definitionally obscures the possibility of women on the left and men in feminism. We 
worry that much use of the metaphor codes the relationship of feminism to the left in exclusionary 
heterosexual and monogamous terms - as in Terrell ĂƌǀĞƌ ?ƐƋƵŝƉ ?however flippantly intended, that 
feminism and MarǆŝƐŵǁĞƌĞ ‘ŵĂĚĞĨŽƌĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ? P ‘ƚŚŝƐĐŽƵƉůĞǁŝůůĂůǁĂǇƐŚ ǀĞĂŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?(2009: 
255). Finally, there is little elaboration of the implicit progressive alternative, and thus no yardstick 
by which improvements in feminism ?s relation to the left might be judged.  
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Overall, then, feminist critics of the relation with the left tend to apply the metaphor of marriage 
with insufficient care and reflection. In so doing, they may not only misrepresent the solidarity 
relationships they seek to describe, but also circumscribe our ways of thinking about political 
solidarity. As we will show with regard to Scotland, even where interconnections are constrained or 
difficult, the notion that feminism is a subordinated helpmeet to a single dominant force on the left 
does not capture the complexity of current organisational and ideological relationships. Before we 
turn to our empirical case, however, we show how the metaphor can be reworked by closer 
engagement with feminist critiques and reconstructions of the institution of marriage. 
 
II. Transforming Marriage as Institution and Metaphor 
 
At this point, we seek to explore whether more careful and reflexive use of the marriage metaphor is 
possible, in ways that might better illuminate solidarity relationships and how best to strengthen 
them. For ƐƵĐŚĂƚĂƐŬ ?ǁĞƚƵƌŶƚŽƚŚĞǁĞůůƐƉƌŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƵŶŚĂƉƉǇŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ?ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?
longstanding feminist critiques of marriage as an institution. In so doing, we do not mean to endorse 
the referential view that language transparently reflects empirical reality; rather our point in more 
constitutive terms is that the cognitive effect of the marriage metaphor for feminists is shaped by a 
particular discursive field in which marriage has already become freighted with particular baggage 
that we seek here to unpack. Moreover, in recent years considerable feminist energy has been spent 
on thinking through how to do marriage differently, providing discursive resources on which to draw 
in conceptualising ƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞƵŶŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚŵĂŶŶĞƚĂů ?ƐŽĚĞƐŝƌĞ ?/ŶǁŚĂƚĨŽůůŽǁƐ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ǁĞ
review feminist critiques and reconstructions of the institution of marriage, examining both for their 
conception of the gendered subject, of power dynamics and of affective structure. 
 
We focus on feminist critiques of the internal dynamics of traditional marriage (reviewed in 
Bevacqua, 2004; Finlay and Clarke, 2003). On this account, marriage imposes a constricting and 
static gendered identity upon its participants. Conceived as a union for life between one man and 
one woman, for the primary purpose of biological reproduction, the female partner is defined in 
terms of her reproductive capacities, giving rise to gender roles that significantly constrain the 
possibilities for human subjectivity (e.g., de Beauvoir, 1997 [1949]: 445-500; Firestone, 2015 [1970]). 
In addition, traditional marriage is characterised as hierarchically arranged, with the man as head of 
the household elevated over the woman who is his helpmeet  W an arrangement designed to 
facilitate male autonomy and equality in the public sphere as worker and citizen (e.g., Pateman, 
1988). A wife, in contrast, is subordinated and dependent: expected to sublimate her goals and 
interests to those of her husband, she is vulnerable to exploitation and violence, and has limited 
right of exit (e.g., Friedman, 2003: chaps 6 and 7). Connectedly for feminist critics, the affective 
structure of traditional marriage hinges on the institutionalisation of heteronormativity (Jackson, 
2006; Ingraham, 1994; Bevacqua, 2004), mononormativity (Barker and Langdridge, 2010; Willey, 
2015; Jackson and Scott, 2004) and, at least in modern western contexts, a possessive sense of 
romantic love (Ingraham, 2008; Friedman, 2003: chap 6; Firestone, 2015 [1970]: chaps 6 and 7). 
Together, these truncate the possibilities for emotional and sexual fulfilment for the female partner, 
in particular, positioning her as an object of desire rather than an active sexual agent, and 
constraining her relationships with other women (Rosa, 1994; Comer, 1974). 
 
In contrast, the progressive alternative imagined by feminists requires, first, a more expansive and 
inclusive understanding of the individual subjectivities of those people participating in the 
relationship. Most obviously, on this view, marriage can and should encompass previously 
marginalised LGBT individuals (e.g., Bevacqua, 2004). More radically, individual subjectivity within 
marriage  W or any romantic partnership - may be conceived as multiplicitous, shifting and  ‘ďŽƌĚĞƌ-
ĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐ ? Pdisrupting masculine/feminine, hetero/homo dichotomies; expressing an array of needs 
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and desires; and potentially having a range of diverse love objects and significant relationships (e.g., 
Heckert, 2010). Second, in terms of the power structure between partners in a progressive union, 
moral and financial equality is presumed, along with the interdependence of the couple in pursuing 
the shared project of marriage. Thus neither partner is entirely autonomous or entirely dependent, 
and certainly one is not expected to sublimate their life goals and identity within the marriage which 
should instead be mutually supportive (e.g., Brake, 2016; Gunnarsson, 2016). Third, the affective 
structure of marriage changes in accordance with these shifts in the subject and power relations. 
Romance and monogamous (hetero)sexual desire, along with their flipsides of repression, sexual 
possessiveness and jealousy, give way to more respectful, emotionally intelligent and empathetic 
interactions between marriage partners who may pursue sexual liaisons elsewhere and who base 
their connection on affinity and friendship rather than desire (e.g., Brake, 2016; Robinson, 1997; 
Barker and Langdridge, 2010).  
 
<insert Table 1 around here> 
 
Table 1 summarises these contrasting traditional and progressive models of the institution of 
marriage. It can also, we suggest, be read as an analytical schema for refining and expanding the 
marriage metaphor. Read this way, the table indicates that feminist analysts of solidarity with the 
left can ask more expansive and nuanced questions about political subjects (who or what are the 
partners in this union, what are their characteristics?), the power structure of the political 
relationship (how in concrete terms is the union organised, how is power distributed within it?), and 
the affective structure (what are the actual and expected emotional and bodily responses of the 
political partners to each other?). The first and second set of questions underpins the extensive 
feminist literature on subjectivities in parliamentary political parties (e.g., Childs, 2006; Kenny et al., 
2015), and the second and third features in work on affective and power structures in left 
movements (e.g., Downes, 2016; Coleman and Bassi, 2011). However, applying the tripartite schema 
permits analyses of solidarity in specific contexts to be more sensitive to the manifold challenges 
faced by feminists on the left, enabling us to see, for example, how a site of left organising may 
accommodate feminists as actors while maintaining unequal gendered affective relations. We seek 
next to demonstrate this in relation to our Scottish case studies, after briefly explaining our reasons 
for selecting the cases and our research methods. 
 
III. Applying the Expanded Marriage Metaphor to the Scottish Context 
 
Our empirical approach in this article is not a discourse-analytic one; that is, we do not focus in our 
cases on how the marriage metaphor functions within particular discursive contexts. Instead, we 
adopt a more straightforwardly empirical research strategy, aiming to show how organisational 
identity, structure and practices can be illuminated by the expanded marriage metaphor framework 
developed above. We do so partly because of a shared commitment to, broadly, critical theory 
principles that push us to engage with material political constraints and possibilities for change, and 
partly because we seek to shed new light on pre-existing datasets from our research into Occupy 
Glasgow, RIC and the SNP.2  
 
Our cases are drawn from the upsurge of left mobilisation before, during and after the 2012-14 
Scottish independence referendum process, which we see as a crucial moment on the Scottish left, 
deserving of wider attention. We chose each case as representing different left ideologies, namely 
anarchism, socialism and social democracy, thus enabling us to extend the marriage metaphor 
beyond feminism and Marxism. Briefly, Occupy Glasgow was established in September 2011, part of 
a wave of global protest against unchecked corporate and political power that took the form of 
localised forms of direct democracy and occupation of public space (e.g., Pickerill et al., 2015). The 
anarchistic ethos found across the movement (e.g., Graeber, 2013) was manifested in Glasgow, 
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albeit the camp was quite ideologically mixed, as we shall discuss below. It was also relatively small, 
conflictual and short-lived: after a gang rape on site, the camp moved to Kelvingrove Park in the 
west end of the city, splintered into two and subsequently folded after a storm in December of the 
same year. RIC was founded in 2012, to provide an alternative, more radical pro-independence voice 
to the SNP in the referendum campaign that had just been launched. Still ongoing, RIC is an umbrella 
organisation and does not define itself ideologically. However, it was established and driven by the 
Marxist International Socialist Group and the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) and we treat it here as a 
site of socialist politics. The SNP is the most formal and bureaucratic in form of our three cases, and 
also the longest-lived: founded in 1934, it has been the party of government in Scotland from 2007, 
and from 2014, is a minority government under First Minister Nicola Sturgeon. In recent years, the 
SNP has defined itself as a  ‘ůĞĨƚŽĨĐĞŶƚƌĞ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĂŶĚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝve pĂƌƚǇ ? ?^EW ? ? ? ? ? ?
although this is combined with a commitment to some neoliberal orthodoxies (Paterson, 2015). We 
thus treat the SNP as an exemplar of (qualified) social democracy.  
 
Our data on these cases consist primarily of face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with self-
identified feminists, supplemented by a range of relevant documents. The reliance on interviews 
enables exploration of subjective participant perceptions of the relationship between feminism and 
other left actors, and provides useful insights that cannot be discerned from documents, particularly 
around affective structure. To be clear, interviewees were not asked about political solidarity per se 
ŶŽƌĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞƵƚŝůŝƚǇŽĨ,ĂƌƚŵĂŶ ?ƐƵŶŚĂƉƉǇŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌ ?we 
analyse interviewee perceptions of the relationships between feminism and the left and practices of 
solidarity through the lens provided by the expanded marriage metaphor. The willingness of 
interviewees to be open about these perceptions was enhanced in the cases of RIC and the SNP in 
particular by the fact that researchers were also participants in these organisations: this gave us 
 ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞƌ ?ĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚŶŽt otherwise have been possible.3 We were all also known feminists to 
our interviewees. This may have discouraged non-feminists from talking to us, and articulating 
directly their neutrality on or hostility to the issues discussed, but it also meant we had shared 
reference points with interviewees and were able to provide a safe space for other feminists to talk 
about their struggles (discussed at more length in Eschle, 2018). The full dataset consists of 
interviews conducted in 2014 with seven activists heavily involved in Occupy Glasgow or the 
campaign for its closure, and an additional two from Occupy Edinburgh, supplemented by 
information available on internet and social media sites; thirty-four interviews with RIC activists and 
three core organisers, also conducted in 2014, as well as documents published by the organisation 
before and after that point; and ten interviews conducted 2016-17 with members of parliament, 
high-ranking cabinet members and party officials in the SNP, in combination with a selection of party 
and policy documents. In what follows, we use pseudonyms for all interviewees from Occupy 
Glasgow and RIC, with SNP interviewees identified by letter and number (details of location and 
dates of the referenced interviews are listed at the end of the article). We analyse the data from 
each of the cases in turn in the light of the expanded marriage metaphor outlined above, beginning 
with Occupy Glasgow. 
 
Occupy Glasgow 
 
It is immediately clear that the collective subjects participating in the Occupy Glasgow  ‘ŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ?are 
not accurately captured by the trope of two singular, unitary, hetero-gendered persons. For a start, 
there were more than two groups on site. Indeed, interviewees Lindsay, Katrina, Elaine and Ryan 
described myriad, cross-cutting factions, including a group of young hackers who were involved 
ŽŶůŝŶĞ ?ƉĂƌƚǇŝŶŐ ‘ŚŝƉƉŝĞƐ ? ? women and men experiencing homelessness; the feminist Glasgow 
tŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĐƚŝǀŝƐƚ&ŽƌƵŵ (GWAF), which became involved after the rape to try to close the camp 
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down; and several individuals holding extreme right-wing, anti-semitic views. However, Elaine also 
reported ƚǁŽŵĂŝŶ ? ‘ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ĐƌǇƐƚĂůůŝƐŝŶŐŽŶƐŝƚĞ after the rape. If these groups can be 
interpreted as the partners in this marriage, they were not in a heteronormative partnership given 
both were numerically male-dominated and were arguably performing rival masculinities. Of these 
two groups, the one which negotiated with the local council and spoke to the press was led by men 
described by Elaine as self-ƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ‘ŚĞƌŽ-ŐƵǇƐ ?ĂŶĚďǇZǇĂŶĂƐ ‘ǀĞƌǇǀŽĐĂůŵĞŶƚŚĂƚǁŽŵĞŶĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ
ŬŶŽǁ ?ĂŶĚĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĨĞĞůĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůĞĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ ? ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĚŽmineering manner and 
hostility to feminism (albeit Ryan acknowledged they gained support from several women he 
characterised as apolitical and submissive). Their initial statement to the media in response to the 
rape was castigated by all our interviewees for victim-blaming. In response, some feminist women 
on site actively sought allyship with what Elaine described as the  ‘ŐĞŶƚůĞŐƵǇƐ ? ?resulting in the 
emergence of a rival, second group that appears to have performed a progressive, women-oriented, 
emotionally-open masculinity: according to Elaine, this second group were devastated by the rape 
and the press release,  ‘men and women alike, we were all crying'. Read in this light, the gendered 
composition of the two main groups does not map onto the subjects expected in the traditional 
model of marriage. As Bella ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞƐ ? ‘ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂĐůĞĂƌĚŝǀŝĚĞ ?ďƵƚ ? ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞǇǁ ƌĞŵĞŶŽƌ
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŵĂƚƚĞƌ ? ? 
 
In addition, there was no ƵŶŝĨŝĞĚĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚ ‘ƐĞůĨ ?ĂƚƚŚĞĐĂŵƉ ?According to Elaine, Joanne and Bella, 
self-identified feminists were few and far between, with numbers diminishing further after the rape 
and subsequent response. Katrina and Elaine both confirm that those remaining made contact with 
GWAF, which then sent representatives to facilitate a ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ: this meeting proposed a 
women-only camp, but the initiative collapsed after sustained male anger at their temporary 
exclusion from the space led to the GWAF facilitator leaving in tears. GWAF subsequently intensified 
its campaign for closure (Glasgow Women's Activist Forum, 2011; see also McAlpine, 2011), even as 
other feminists remained active on site. Thus feminism was an attenuated, scattered and conflicted 
presence at the camp, an element in one of the two marriage  ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ? ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽĂƌƚŝĐulated 
separately to both. 
 
Turning to the power structure of the camp, we find evidence of a commitment to inclusive and 
horizontal modes of participation in line with wider Occupy practices and the movement mantra, 
 ‘ǁĞĂƌĞƚŚĞ ? ?A? ? ? Thus Bella and Poppy underscored the use of participatory techniques in meetings, 
and a rally the second Saturday featured speakers invited from a range of campaigns, in opposition 
to corporate and council greed, and environmental destruction, and in support of refugee rights and 
local services (McGuigan, 2011). In these ways, the camp fits the structure of the progressive 
marriage model in terms of partners regulating their relations through democratic procedures, and 
being mutually suppoƌƚŝǀĞŽĨĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ?This is not the whole story, however. Ryan 
described participation in nightly meetings as superficiĂůĂŶĚŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚĞĚ P ‘ŝƚǁĂƐĐůĞĂƌůǇƉƌĞ-
ĐĂƵĐƵƐĞĚ ? ?the decision on who was to do what  ? was definitely happening outwith the democratic 
structures ?. In addition, the depth of the commitment to a range of struggles is questionable. None 
of the speeches made on the rally discussed above referenced gendered inequalities, and some 
interviewees claimed their initiatives on site were either simply not enacted  W ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƐĂĨĞƌ
ƐƉĂĐĞƐƉŽůŝĐǇ ?was represented by Ryan as  ‘a box-ƚŝĐŬŝŶŐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ?- or actively blocked, as in the 
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůĨŽƌĂǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĐĂŵƉĂďŽǀĞ. On this account, the relationships between feminists and 
others on site functioned to subordinate or marginalise feminist activists and to subsume feminist 
goals, thus approximating a marriage closer to the traditional model. 
 
In this light, it is hardly surprising that the affective dimension of the relationship between feminism 
and others at Occupy Glasgow turned increasingly toxic. Bella and Poppy described the camp in ways 
akin to a progressive marriage failing to live up to its potential, with participants failing to do the 
necessary work to ensure full equality and emotional care, despite their initial rhetoric. However, 
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others attested that for them this political marriage was from the outset much more traditional in its 
affective structure, and negatively so, based on the desire to control rather than mutual attraction, 
and quickly becoming violent. In this vein, Elaine emphasised  ‘loads of instances of aggression, all 
ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ ? ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌĚfeminists; while Lindsay reported  ‘ĞŶŽƌŵŽƵƐ ?ŝŵŵĞŶƐĞƉƌĞĚĂƚŽƌǇ
behaviour ? which meant, according to Joanne, that women in Occupy Glasgow were  ‘ĨĂŝƌŐĂŵĞ ? ?It is 
therefore unsurprising that the experience of Occupy Glasgow was described by Ryan ĂƐ ‘quite 
ŚŽƌƌŝďůĞ ? ? For several interviewees, ƚŚŝƐ ‘ŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ?was not merely unhappy, but abusive. 
 
The Radical Independence Campaign 
 
Like Occupy, the collective subjects participating in RIC are not accurately captured by the trope of 
two unitary, hetero-gendered persons. From the outset, RIC has been a coalition between a range of 
ideological forces on the left, including the Green Party, the SSP, trades unions and civil society 
organisations, all of which retain their autonomous identity. Moreover, RIC is also pluralistic in more 
spatial terms, given that it is structured through autonomous local groups that sent elective 
representatives to the National Forums held every other month during the referendum campaign, as 
well as to annual country-wide conferences that decide national strategy (RIC, 2015). The gendered 
composition of these collective subjects within RIC is also complex, with interviewees Jashar and 
Teresa reporting 40-50% of active participants in the referendum period to be women, and a high 
level of feminist identification at the grassroots. Plenary speakers at each of the national 
conferences in this period also included feminist figures, culled from a range of existing 
organisations and ideological orientations, including trade unionist Cat Boyd, Green Party co-
convenor Maggie Chapman, and Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament organiser Isobel Lindsay. In 
such ways, Z/ ?ƐĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐare characterised by the integration of both women and men 
and by cross-cutting feminist identifications. RIC is not a conventional marriage between a male and 
female partner, but a polyamorous union of many. 
 
If it is still possible to think of RIC as a marriage, it is one that has been, to some degree, managed 
through an egalitarian structure at the national level. Several initiatives reflect the fact that equality 
has long been enshrined as a key normative plank in RI ?ƐƉŽůicy agenda (RIC, 2017). According to 
Iain, a 50:50 policy was adopted for all events, platforms and statements in the early stages of 
organising the first RIC conference in 2012. It was suggested by Manjit that this happened after 
women opposed the publication of a list of signatories of support for RIC that was predominantly 
men; Robert confirms it was Ă ‘ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ƚŽ ‘create the image this is an organisation led by 
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƌƵŶďǇǁŽŵĞŶ ? ?The strategy was successful, with women as many oĨZ/ ?ƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐƉƵďůŝĐ
figures and 50:50 actively implemented at all of the conferences from 2012 until 2016. Nonetheless, 
local groups appear to have varied substantially in their gender composition and commitment to 
gender equality, with most interviewees mentioning that their local group was numerically male-
dominated. At the same time, Nora drew attention to ƚŚĞ ‘young men running everything ?Ăƚ
national RIC, and Alex confirmed that it was the men  ‘ďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĞƐ ?ǁŚŽƉƵůůƚŚĞƐƚƌŝŶŐƐ ? ?Such 
comments indicate that there remain internal gendered hierarchies within RIC.  
 
Moreover, there is some evidence that feminist partners in this multi-partner marriage, while 
retaining their autonomous feminist identity, have had to subordinate their goals. Feminists Boyd, 
Chapman and Lindsay, for instance, aside from references to equal gender representation, did not 
take explicitly feminist perspectives in their speeches at conference plenaries 2012-16. Only feminist 
economist Ailsa McKay did so. Perhaps connectedly, there is no explicitly feminist orientation to RIC 
written material. This may reflect a more general eschewal of ideological positions, or their 
 ‘ŽƵƚƐŽƵƌĐŝŶŐ ?ƚŽĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ. However, we suggest the problem runs deeper, as can be 
seen in the most comprehensive statement of the politics of RIC, written by Foley and Ramand 
(2014). The authors engage directly with concepts of capitalism, neoliberalism and imperialism, but - 
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although they make a handful of feminist demands around parliamentary quotas, equal pay, 
maternity and paternity leave and free childcare toward the end of the book  W do not discuss 
feminist concepts or their connection to the radical independence struggle. In response, one of us 
co-published a short feminist manifesto (Boyd and Morrison, 2014) , which RIC supported and 
publicised. However, this has been used instrumentally by some RIC members to demonstrate 
 ‘ĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚ ? credentials, underscoring a relative failure to incorporate feminist ideology into the core 
analysis of the organisation.  
 
Thus it is not surprising that there are contradictions in the affective relations between feminists and 
others in RIC. A safer spaces policy was successfully established at the national level in 2014 after 
being promoted by feminists in the local RIC groups. However, activist Samantha described 
resistance to the introduction of this policy, pointing to the persistence of sexist behaviour and 
hostility to feminist responses: 
 
we had a discussion at that National Forum where exclusively men said  ‘/ĚŽŶ ?ƚ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚǇǁĞŶĞĞĚƚŚŝƐ ?ŝƚ ?ƐĂƐŝůůǇŝĚĞĂ ? and literally shouted across the whole 
room at each other about how safer spaces was a ridiculous idea; meanwhile the 
women in the room sat back for a little while, rolling our eyes and crossing our arms 
and thinking it was ridiculous and after they had all done their shouting bit we stepped 
in and said this is why, and it passed, it is policy, but I think it is a case in point that 
ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐŝƐŶ ?ƚƋƵŝƚĞƚŚĞƌĞ ? 
 
Interviewees Alex and Lorna also reported the presence of men in RIC known to have been abusive. 
In that light, the solidarity between feminists and others within RIC is limited and selective; public 
performances of mutual respect are not always sustained internally. Affective relations within RIC 
have not reached the nadir they did at Occupy Glasgow, however, and feminists continue to strive to 
push the organisation in a feminist direction. TŚŝƐ ‘ŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ? therefore remains a work in progress, 
unhappy in some respects and with some of its more progressive potentials not yet fully realised. 
 
The Scottish National Party 
 
Just as with Occupy and RIC, the collective subjects in the SNP are not best understood through the 
concept of singular, unitary persons bound to a traditional heteronormative marriage. Although SNP 
membership remains primarily male (Keen and Audickas, 2017: 18; Mitchell et al., 2011: 60), the 
dominance of traditional masculine codes of conduct in the party is declining according to 
interviewees P2 and P7, and there have long been prominent women in the party. Party leader and 
First Minister at the time of writing, Nicola Sturgeon, is explicitly and publicly feminist. Some 
interviewees, both men and women, also identified with feminism, with one (P4) observing the 
dissemination of this identity among male party figures:  ‘/ ?ĚůŝŬĞƚŽƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚŝƚ ?ƐƚŚĞĨĞŵŝŶŝƐm that 
counts, not the gender, bĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞ ?ǀĞŚĂĚŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŵĞŶǁŚŽĂƌĞĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?. 
Whether this claimed merger of feminism and social democratic identity is sustainable and 
underpinned by substantive feminist practice should be open to critical questioning; nonetheless, it 
is clear this is not in any meaningful sense a union of male social democrats dominating female 
feminists. 
 
Turning to the power structure in this relationship, it needs to be acknowledged that the SNP is a 
hierarchical organisation, having transitioned ĨƌŽŵďĞŝŶŐĂŶ ‘ĂŵĂƚĞƵƌ-ĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚ ?ƉĂƌƚǇƚŽĂŶ ‘ĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂů-
ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ?ƉĂƌƚǇŝŶƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-devolution era (Mitchell et al., 2011). This structure has made it 
possible for the party leadership to partially implement equality between women and men as a key 
principle, from the top down. Notably, under Sturgeon ?ƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ the SNP has implemented a 
gender-balanced Scottish Government cabinet. One interviewee (L1) was keen to stress that gender 
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ĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŚĂƐďĞĞŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶprocedures over time, with equal 
representation of women a party leadership priority for at least fifteen years. Formal parity 
mechanisms are now underpinned by a political mentoring programme that creates mutual support 
and interdependence between feminists and other party members. Such measures are considered 
by L1 to have had an  ‘ĞŵďŽůĚĞŶŝŶŐ ? effect on female members, helping to bring more of them to the 
fore as candidates for political office. Yet, there appears to have been a relative failure to establish 
gender equal norms at the local branch and council level (see Kenny et al., 2017). In public policy 
terms,  ‘ ?Ğ ?quality for women is aƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐǀŝƐŝŽŶĨŽƌ ĂĨĂŝƌĞƌ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ? ?^EW ? ?17b), 
with interviewees P2, P4, P6 and P7 citing a range of policies as evidence of this claim, from the 
flagship childcare policy, through to the decision to use the lĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŽĨ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚƐ
welfare reform, to the agenda on violence against women and girls. However, it can be argued that 
egalitarian public policies exist in tension with the SNP commitment to neoliberal economic policy 
(Paterson, 2015). In sum, there is still some way to go to institutionalise an egalitarian structure in all 
domains of this political marriage.  
 
As for the affective structure of the SNP, our interviewees claim this has changed in a progressive 
direction over time. Just as RIC organisers appealed to the importance of gender equality, senior 
figures in the SNP were open to changing attitudes to gender equality. As interviewee L1 reported of 
his change in consciousness:  
 
/ ?ǀĞůĞĂƌŶƚ ?that unless you do something actively to encourage and motivate 
ŐĞŶĚĞƌĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ŝƚ ?ůůƉƌŽďĂďůǇŶŽƚŚĂƉƉĞŶ ? so the first tranche of things that I 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ ?were about encouragement, motivation, training of women to 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ ?/ŚĂĚƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚ/ ?ŵƉĂƌƚŽĨthat consciousness of change within the 
ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŽĨŽƵƌĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƚŽƐƚĂŶĚŝŶĨƌŽŶƚŽĨƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇĂŶĚƐĂǇ “ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŝƐ
ŶŽǁ ? ?
 
Positive affective relations can also be seen in the approbation expressed for SturŐĞŽŶ ?s 
championing of feminism, felt by interviewee P4 to be Ă ‘source of  ‘ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?.
Another (P17) reported that during the 80s and into the 90s, a  ‘ŵĂĐŚŽĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?was normalised in the 
party, that has since been successfully challenged. This more positive image of affective relations 
relative to RIC and Occupy may in part be a result of the fact that our interviewees were senior 
figures in positions of power and perhaps less inclined to explicitly critique their own party. In this 
regard, we note the complaints of sexual harassment levelled against ex-party leader Alex Salmond 
while First Minister, breaking news at the time of writing, along with apparent evidence of misogyny 
in online responses from some supporters (Smith, 2018; Garivelli, 2018)  Although Sturgeon has 
robustly defended the need to take the accusations seriously, the episode surely raises questions 
about the depth of respect for feminism at all levels of the party that merit further exploration. 
Certainly, some interviewees reported that resentment of feminism was expressed by some rank-
and-file party members who opposed the introduction of gender equality mechanisms for national 
elections in 2016, largely because of the perceived clash with selection based on merit. In that light, 
it appears this marriage of feminism and social democracy may be moving towards greater mutual 
respect, but unevenly and inconsistently; there remains some way to go. 
 
<insert Table 2 here> 
 
Table 2 summarises these complexities in the relations between feminism and the wider left in the 
contemporary Scottish context in terms of our reworking of the marriage metaphor. None of these 
cases was composed by the two hetero-gendered subjects of traditional marriage; in all, participants 
had sought to institute more progressive power structures with varying degrees of success and with 
ǀĂƌǇŝŶŐŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐĨŽƌĂĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?KĐĐƵƉǇ'ůĂƐŐŽǁ ?ƐƚǁŽŵĂŝŶĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƐ could perhaps be 
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characterised as performing rival masculinities, but the lip-service paid to participatory structures 
masked the dominance of anti-feminist forces, which gave rise to a toxic emotional atmosphere. 
RIC ?ƐƉŽůǇĂŵŽƌŽƵƐƵŶŝŽŶis composed of fluid, multiple subjects and has institutionalised progressive 
power structures to some extent, although these fall short of full equality for feminists and there are 
still affective limitations. The merger of feminist and social democratic subjectivities in the 
leadership of the SNP has enabled steps toward the incorporation of gender equality into power 
structures and policy goals, and some progress toward an affective atmosphere of mutual respect, 
even if this journey is still to be completed. In all these cases, it seems clear that gender equality is 
increasingly rhetorically central to sites of left politics in Scotland, and even sometimes formally 
instituted, but that full ideological integration and affective harmony between feminists and their 
allies often lag behind. As such, our expansion of the marriage metaphor beyond the narrow 
confines of the unhappy traditional model allows a more differentiated and nuanced account of the 
relationship of feminism to the left in Scotland to emerge, without glossing over the undoubted 
difficulties that remain.   
 
Conclusions  
 
This article has revisited the unhappy marriage metaphor as a way of thinking about political 
solidarity between feminists and other actors on the left. In part one, we discussed the persistence 
of the metaphor and the way it is deployed in political discourse and academic perspectives to treat 
the partners in the union as unitary and separate, as hierarchically gendered and in a relationship 
structured by heterosexual desire. In part two, we revisited the feminist literature on the institution 
of marriage and sought to rework the metaphor more critically and expansively, to reflect both the 
limitations of the traditional model of marriage and the possibilities of more progressive 
alternatives. In the third and final part, we applied our reworked metaphor to three recent cases of 
Scottish left politics, showing the different ways the political marriage has played out in these 
particular contexts. 
 
In this way, we hope to have demonstrated that reframing and expanding the marriage metaphor 
serves to reveal more of the complexity and diversity in ĨĞŵŝŶŝƐŵ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂůůŝĂŶĐĞƐ. Parsing the 
metaphor into the three elements of the gendered subject, power structures and affective relations, 
has allowed us to pay attention to different elements of the feminist experience of working in and 
with left organisations. Expanding the metaphor to include both traditional and progressive 
marriage dynamics enables the exposure of familiar, interconnected problems of gendered 
inequality and the marginalising of feminism in left circles while also acknowledging empirical 
evidence of achievements and further possibilities. Together, these analytical moves reveal that the 
 ‘ƵŶŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶĨĞŵŝŶŝƐŵĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌůĞĨƚĨŽƌĐĞƐmay be recurring, but is 
not  ‘natural ?, uniform and universal. It can and should be differentiated analytically according to the 
particular case under investigation or axis of enquiry.  
 
We acknowledge that the conceptualisation and application of the marriage metaphor when 
thinking about political solidarity would benefit from further research. Most obviously, the 
distinctiveness or otherwise of the Scottish cases could be further investigated: after all, while some 
of the contextual underpinnings of these cases are unique, the ideological and organisational forms 
are not. Many of the dynamics we describe are likely to be found elsewhere, and could be fleshed 
out in further context-specific, comparative enquiry. More analytically speaking, the question of the 
difference made by organisational form (protest camp, umbrella organisation or political party, etc) 
requires more attention than we have paid it here. The equivalence drawn by the marriage 
metaphor between collective political actors and individual human beings does not help in this 
endeavour; the fuller incorporation of poststructuralist-influenced re-theorisations of the individual 
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subject as decentred, fluid and multiple may be necessary in order to generate more creative 
reconceptualisations of collective agency.  
 
However, we end with a note of caution about the utility of the marriage metaphor for the 
theorisation of political solidarity, even if radically reframed. This is for three main reasons. First, we 
are concerned that the lens of marriage centres gender in its refraction of political relationships and 
thus, by extension, narrows discussion of solidarity and its problems to a single axis of 
identity/difference. Broadening the definition of the left is clearly insufficient to ensure that groups 
organised around the struggle for racial justice are integrated into alliances, for which we need more 
fully intersectional analytical frameworks - and metaphors that facilitate their development. Second, 
it is perhaps problematic that we rework the marriage metaphor at a moment when arguments 
about political solidarity on the left are increasingly being re-imagined in terms of love (Hardt and 
Negri, 2009; Gregg, 2011), critiqued by Eleanor Wilkinson (2014) for relying on conservative 
ŚĞƚĞƌŽŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞŝĚĞĂůƐ ?ƌŽŵĂŶƚŝĐŝƐŝŶŐďŽƚŚ ‘ůŽǀĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?On this view, feminists 
would be better served disentangling love from solidarity rather than further conflating them.  
 
Finally, we worry that our redeployment of the metaphor reinforces rather than undermines the role 
of marriage in upholding wider social hierarchies. Our discussion above foregrounds feminist 
critiques of marriage in terms of internal relationship dynamics, yet socialist feminists have long 
argued marriage has a wider structural function as a lynchpin of state control and of racial and class 
power. Ensuring stability of property between families and through descent, marriage has allowed 
upper- and middle-class white families to entrench ideological and economic privilege, as well as 
facilitating nation-building and the stabilisation of state borders (Ingraham, 2008; Edwards, 2016; 
Peterson, 2014). This is true even of more progressive forms of marriage (Josephson, 2010; Wilson, 
2010). Just as these will not disturb wider socio-economic and geopolitical inequalities unless they 
are connected to a wider project of social transformation (Nuti, 2016), so refining the marriage 
metaphor for feminist purposes should be but one part of a more creative, radical rethinking of 
solidarity and its material conditions. As feminists continue to fight for full integration into a 
reconfigured left, which would entail an end to gender inequality and sexual violence within left 
ranks as part of a more effective challenge to a revived far right, scholars who see themselves as part 
of that fight should ensure their political imaginaries and language choices aid rather than hinder it. 
In this vein, we end with Iseult Honohan ?Ɛinjunction to political theorists who seek to represent and 
reconstruct political solidarity:  
 
to explore other metaphorical resources  ? These would include alternative metaphors of 
relationships that include people who are more distant and diverse (e.g. colleagues, 
workmates, city-dwellers); that represent interdependence rather than primary 
identification; that emerge in interaction and engagement; that are fluid or have strength in 
extension (as flows, streams, strands, networks, webs); that are based on collective 
attention in a common space (orchestra, audience, public) and that convey unity in diversity 
 ?ŶĞǁŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƐŵĂǇŵĂŬĞŝƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽŝŵĂŐŝŶĞĂŶĚĚƌĂǁĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ
possibilities. (2008: 80-81) 
 
 
Notes
1 tĞŶŽƚĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘EĞǁ ?ŽƌĂŶƚŝ-essentialist strand of Marxist theory that emerged parallel to the 
 ‘ƵŶŚĂƉƉǇŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ?ĚĞďĂƚĞ(e.g., Resnick and Wolff, 1987). In its focus on the production, appropriation and 
allocation of a surplus, this proved more amenable to feminist reworking than more structuralist variants 
and/or those focused on the means of production narrowly defined. Feminist scholars working in the New 
Marxist tradition have analysed the role of the household and of domestic labour, emotional labour, sex work, 
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etc in the production and allocation of a surplus (see, e.g., Fraad et al., 2009; Barker, 2015), in what has been 
characterised by some as a significaŶƚůǇŵŽƌĞ ‘ŚĂƉƉǇ ?ƵŶŝŽŶ(Fraad, 2015). 
2 The data is from three discrete projects PĂƚŚĞƌŝŶĞƐĐŚůĞ ?ƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŽŶ ‘ŶŐĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐWƌŽƚĞƐƚĂŵƉƐ ?(2017; 
2018) ?:ĞŶŶǇDŽƌƌŝƐŽŶ ?ƐWŚŽŶĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚƐŝŶZ/(2018) ĂŶĚDĂŝƌŝdƵůďƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?D^ĐĚŝƐƐĞƌƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶ
political leadership within the SNP. 
3 Morrison was an active participant in RIC during the independence campaign and beyond, while Tulbure is a 
long-term member of the SNP, has been a candidate for local office, and was employed by an SNP MSP (on 
unrelated tasks) at the time of the original research project. Eschle and Alexander also attended RIC events as 
audience members. Our involvement in Occupy Glasgow was more limited, taking the form of a handful of 
brief visits by Eschle and Morrison. 
 
Interviews 
 
Occupy: 
Bella, Glasgow, 22/10/14  
Elaine, near Glasgow, 24/10/14 
Joanne, Glasgow, 06/11/14 
Katrina, Glasgow 06/11/14 
Lindsay, Glasgow, 10/11/14 
Poppy, Glasgow 01/12/14 
Ryan, Glasgow, 04/12/14 
 
RIC: 
Lorna, Glasgow, 15/05/14 
Samantha, Glasgow, 10/06/14 
Teresa, Glasgow, 16/06/14 
Iain, Glasgow, 23/06/14 
Robert, Glasgow, 25/06/14 
Jashar, Glasgow, 26/06/14 
Alex, Edinburgh, 27/06/14 
Manjit, Glasgow, 28/05/14 
Nora, Edinburgh, 16/09/14 
 
SNP: 
L1, Edinburgh, 13/08/2016 
P2, Edinburgh, 28/10/2016 
P4, Edinburgh, 11/11/2016  
P6, Edinburgh, 14/11/2016 
P7, Edinburgh 15/11/2016  
P17, Edinburgh, 30/11/2016  
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